



and let  $B(o)$  denote "the outcome is  $o$ "

so we are considering counterfactuals of the form

$$A \Box \rightarrow B(o)$$

where  $A = (s, s)$ ,  $o = (d_s, z_s)$

$A = (s, p)$ ,  $o = (d_s, z_p)$

$A = (f, s)$ ,  $o = (d_f, z_s)$

$A = (f, f)$ ,  $o = (d_f, z_f)$

1. let  $\bar{I}$  be the actual world.


Then consider  $\exists o! (A \Box \rightarrow B(o))$

This is a Prevalence of Counterfactual Determinateness  
which is False under the standard of  
underdetermination

But  $A \Box \rightarrow \exists o! (B(o))$

a Prevalence of Counterfactual determinateness is  
true.

I.





How can we establish that the matching condition is satisfied with up to the four trees ①, ②, ③ & ④.

2. Let  $\bar{V}$  be the actual world.

Mr. Lewis says ① is true.  
and ② is true.

but not ③ and ④.

3. Nested Counterfactuals:

$\bar{V} \rightarrow \bar{V}$  gives tree ② as seen from world  $\bar{V}$

$\bar{V} \rightarrow \bar{V}$  gives tree ④ as seen from world  $\bar{V}$ .

But the two world  $\bar{V}$ 's we are led to make two routes are not the same world

This is the London - square problem, that can only be solved if we assume determinism.